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The optimal allocation of responsibilities in federal systems is the
subject of continuing debates which span virtually every policy
domain. Since the seminal work of Oates (1972), the fiscal federalism
literature has analyzed the case of tax and expenditure externalities
generated by local public goods, tax competition, or environmental
policies. It has shown that the comparison between centralization and
decentralization boils down to a trade off between the internalization
of cross border externalities and the responsiveness to local prefer
ences. Its central normative conclusion, the Oates Decentralization
Theorem, states that the costs and benefits of fiscal decentralization
hinges on the magnitude of externalities and the heterogeneity of
preferences.
Although this theorem has been invoked in various policy domains
(e.g., Coeure and Pisani Ferry, 2003; Alesina et al., 2005a, 2005b), sofar, fewmodels have been proposed to extend it beyond the fiscal and
environmental spheres. As noted by Ellingsen (1998) (p. 266), “the
study of laws, regulations and standards may require a different
model.” This paper builds a simple model which compares central
ization and decentralization when local policies are laws, regulations,
or standards rather than tax rates or local public goods. The starting
point of our analysis is that the externalities generated by these
nonbudgetary policies, which we call coordination externalities, are of
a different nature than fiscal spillovers. While fiscal externalities
induce a prisoner's dilemma, which typically results in a race to the
bottom, coordination externalities induce a novel collective choice
problem closer to the battle of the sexes,1 which results in a race to
local particularism: all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is
desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization. Our
main finding is that the comparative statics of the decentralization
debate are qualitatively different from the receivedwisdom andmake
a stronger case for decentralization.
While fiscal externalities depend on the level of taxes or public
spending in the neighboring jurisdictions, coordination externalities
are driven by the differences and incompatibilities between local
policies. These externalities can take various forms: heterogeneousand Tirole (1991) (p. 18) for a presentation of the battle-of-
1
3 See Farber (1997); Oates (1999) or Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a literature
review. See also Alesina and Spolaore (1997); Redoano and Scharf (2004) and Alesina
et al. (2005) for a political economy perspective on the tension between heterogeneity
and centralization.
4 An equilibrium in a model of fiscal competition with nonuniform capital tax rates
(e.g., because of heterogeneous fiscal needs) is typically inefficient because differences
in pre-tax returns imply an inefficient allocation of capital. In the case of population
mobility, policy heterogeneity is inefficient because of the mobility costs it generates.
5 The preferences of a jurisdiction i on xi are similar in both setups: the best-
response functions typically exhibit strategic complementarities (Laussel and Le
Breton, 1998) so the equilibrium correspondences are similar. However, the
preferences of jurisdiction i on xj (i.e. the externality effect) are different. For this
reason, the equilibrium welfare analysis is different. I am grateful to a referee for
raising this point.
6 On the benefits of legal harmonization, see Markesinis (1994); Lando (2000), or
Marciano and Josselin (2002) (an edited volume of contributions on the topic).
7 See Daniels (1991) on Canada, Ribstein and Kobayashi (1996) on the U.S., Legrand
(1997) on the E.U. and Black et al. (2000) on Russia. Mattei (1994); Teubner (1998),
and Berkowitz et al. (2003) analyze the efficiency and responsiveness to local
conditions of legal transplants.
8 Mattei (1997) and Zweigert and Kötz (1998) are standard references on
comparative law. On legal convergence, see Berman (1965) on international saleslegal systems generate transaction costs, legal uncertainty, litigation
costs, and duplication of drafting costs. Heterogeneous regulations
such as accounting norms, safety standards, or governance rules
increase compliance costs for international firms. The negative impact
of legal and regulatory fragmentation on trade, competition, and
cross border cooperation is now well documented. An OECD study
has estimated that up to 80% of trade is affected by the heterogeneity
of standards or associated technical regulations.2 According to Rodrik
(2004), transaction costs between advanced countries are of the order
of 40% in ad valorem terms, of which only 5% are due to tariffs and the
remaining 35% are due to the “diversity of national institutional
arrangements.” In the EU, Kox et al. (2005) have estimated that
removing regulation heterogeneity could boost the trade of services
by 30 to 60%. Coordination externalities are not limited to nontariff
barriers to trade: heterogeneous school calendars, academic curricula,
and official languages limit population mobility and labor market
efficiency. In international relations, the inability of the European
states to speak with a single voice on diplomatic matters has
illustrated on several occasions the detrimental effect of having
inconsistent foreign policies.
In this model, under decentralization, heterogeneous preferences,
together with coordination externalities, result in insufficient policy
harmonization, which is consistent with the view of many federal
administrators and international institutions. The rationale, as high
lighted by Snidal (1985) or Garoupa and Ogus (2006), is that
jurisdictions free ride on efforts toward convergence. A natural remedy
for this coordination failure is to impose a uniform policy. Since the
information on local preferences is typically decentralized or unverifi
able, standardization may be the only way for jurisdictions to reduce
policy heterogeneity. However, the benefits of complete harmonization
must be balanced against the inadequacy of a one size fits all policy.
This paper investigates under which conditions imposing a
uniform rule can be socially beneficial. The results are in sharp
contrast with the literature on fiscal and environmental spillovers.
First, if coordination externalities are symmetric, decentralization
dominates any uniform policy regardless of the magnitude of
externalities or the heterogeneity of preferences. The intuition is
that if externalities are symmetric, local jurisdictions internalize half
of the social cost they impose on the federation, which mitigates the
consequences of non cooperative behavior. Second, the cost of
decentralization vanishes as coordination externalities become
sufficiently severe: contrary to the standard public good setup,
when coordination is crucial, the pursuit of self interested policies
by local jurisdictions results in a degree of policy harmonization
which leaves little need for a federal intervention.
These results, derived under standard institutional assumptions,
show that the merit of decentralization hinges critically on the nature
of cross border externalities i.e., whether external costs are driven
by legal distances and policy incompatibilities as in this paper, or by
policy levels as in the fiscal federalism scenario. For instance, one
should not think of the centralization of education expenditures in the
same terms as the harmonization of school curricula. Similarly, the
centralization of police expenditures should not be justified by the
same criteria as criminal law codification. Likewise, the harmoniza
tion of corporate tax rates and the standardization of accounting
norms should not proceed from the same logic. When the fiscal
prisoner's dilemma turns into an administrative or legislative battle
of the sexes, a greater interdependence and a greater need for
coordination may not justify a federal intervention.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3 lays out the model.
Section 4 derives our main results. Section 5 analyzes the case of
discontinuous network effects and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are
relegated to Appendix A.2 “Regulatory Reform and International Standardization,” Paris: OECD Working
Party of the Trade Committee, 1999.2. Related literature
The majority of the economic literature on federalism has focused
on fiscal and environmental externalities, as in the seminal contribu
tions of Oates (1972); Gordon (1983); Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986), and Wilson (1986). The central normative result, the Oates
Decentralization Theorem, states that greater externalities and/or
more homogeneous preferences make the case for centralization.3
Both comparative static results do not hold in the collective choice
problem analyzed in this paper. Moreover, our results show that the
precise patterns of interjurisdictional externalities are more impor
tant than their magnitude. Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate
(2003) show in fiscal federalism setups that the Decentralization
Theorem may fail because of political economy distortions. In our
case, it fails even under standard institutional assumptions.
One might at first think that the discrepancy between fiscal
federalism models and this one comes from the fact that fiscal
spillovers are driven by policy levels while coordination externalities
are driven by policy differences. However, in some models of fiscal
federalism for instance, tax competition with mobile factors
(Bucovetsky et al., 1998) or redistribution with population mobility
(Brown and Oates, 1987; Wildasin, 1991) policy heterogeneity is
inherently socially suboptimal as in our setup.4 However, these
models are not strategically equivalent to ours because the
distributional impact of heterogeneous policies on local jurisdiction
is not the same. In the fiscal competition case, only the high tax
jurisdiction suffers from the tax differential: the welfare of a given
jurisdiction i is typically decreasing in the tax level of another
jurisdiction j. In the coordination case, both jurisdictions suffer from
the difference between their policies: the welfare of jurisdiction i is
unimodal in xj with a maximum at xj=xi.5
The law literature has documented the costs generated by
heterogeneous laws,6 and also the cost of legal harmonization due to
theheterogeneity of legal cultures and social customs.7 The comparative
law literature and the law and economics literature have investigated
whether increasing economic integration and competition between
legal systems will eventually result in legal convergence, and whether
legal convergence is socially desirable.8 With the exception of Garoupa
and Ogus (2006), who study a two country two action model, the
normative literature on legal harmonization typically take existing legal
systems asfixed and qualitatively compares the costs generated by their
heterogeneity to the cost of a one size fits all legal code. Our
equilibrium analysis suggests that the incentive faced by local policylaw, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) on corporate governance, Legrand (1996) on
the E.U. and Smythe (2008) on the uniform sales act in the U.S. Garoupa and Ogus
(2006) and Carbonara and Parisi (2007) propose game-theoretic models of legal
convergence.
2
9 For standard references on the cost of legal heterogeneity, see Section 2.
10 U.S. Code, Chapter 58, section 991: United States Sentencing Commission;
establishment and purposes.
11 A choice-of-law clause does not eliminate these issues completely because certain
types of breaches allow the court to change the choice-of-law rule. Moreover, there
might not be a jurisdiction whose law satisfies both parties.
12 On the effect of diversity on the formation of a national identity, see Hurlburt
(1987).makers will result in a satisfactory degree of voluntary harmonization
regardless of the relative magnitude of these costs.
Baniak and Grazl (2009) have independently developed a similar
model of harmonization of legal standards. It differs from ours in that
jurisdictions are ex ante identical and the authors focus on the impact
of information dispersion. Despite these differences, they show that
decentralization dominates centralization under a symmetry condi
tion similar to ours.
In international relations, Snidal (1985) and Mattli and Büthe
(2003), among others, have argued that certain conflicts of interest
are better described by coordination games than by the prisoner's
dilemma. Finally, in organization theory, Alonso et al. (2008) and
Rantakari (2008) analyze strategic communication in a coordination
game similar to ours and show that a greater need for coordination
improves the quality of communication under decentralization.
3. The model
We consider a finite set I of jurisdictions which can be variously
interpreted as countries, members of a federation, localities, or even
individuals in a community. The welfare of the residents of
jurisdiction i is denoted by Ui. As a social ordering criterion, we use
the Benthamite social welfare function B=∑iωiUi, where ωi is the
social weight of jurisdiction i.
3.1. Policies and preferences
In line with the existing literature on federalism, our model relies
on two key ingredients: heterogeneous local preferences and
interjurisdictional externalities. We focus on a class of externalities,
henceforth coordination externalities, whose magnitude depends on
the differences between policies.
As we will see in Subsection 3.2, the types of policies that generate
coordination externalities cover a wide range of public issues. To
encompass these various situations, we cast our argument in an
abstract setting where the policy space X is ℝk. An alternative is a
vector of local policies x and xi∈X refers to the policy of jurisdiction i.
We interpret the Euclidean distance ‖xi−xj‖ as the degree of
similarity or compatibility between xi and xj (the “legal distance” in
Carbonara and Parisi, 2007). For multifaceted policies composed of a
large number of discrete components, the distance between two
policies can be interpreted as the number, or the proportion of
(possibly weighted) items on which they differ (see Kox et al., 2005
and Carbonara and Parisi, 2007). The welfare of the citizens of
jurisdiction i is given by:
Ui xð Þ = Vi xið Þ−∑
j≠i
βi; jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
; ð1Þ
where the function W: ℝ+→ℝ is weakly increasing and, by
convention W(0)=0. Hence, all jurisdictions agree that some
harmonization is desirable but each jurisdiction i has a distinct ideal
policy given by arg maxVi.
The term βi, jW(‖xi−xj‖) is the coordination externality borne by
jurisdiction i for having a policy which is different from that of
jurisdiction j. The term Vi(xi) embodies the intrinsic preferences of
jurisdiction i, i.e., whether its local policy meets the specific needs of
its residents. If we assume that before the federation was formed, the
policy of each jurisdiction i was arg maxVi and jurisdictions were
independent of each other (β≡0), then Vi(xi) can alternatively be
interpreted as the adaptation cost borne by jurisdiction i for changing
its policy from arg maxVi to xi: the cost of re drafting the law,
adapting pre existing enforcement rules, reforming institutions, and
the loss of legal coherence with other domestic laws.
The externality matrix β=(βi, j)j≠ i introduces relational hetero
geneity to allow for a variety of patterns of interdependence betweenjurisdictions. These patterns can reflect the networks of bilateral
trade, exchanges or cooperation projects between local jurisdictions.
The profile (Vi)i∈ I introduces idiosyncratic heterogeneity to take into
account the variety of local circumstances and preferences across
jurisdictions. These variations may be due to differences in legal
cultures, social customs, and pre existing rules and institutions
(Legrand, 1996; Teubner, 1998; Black et al., 2000; Berkowitz et al.,
2003); income (Ganuza and Gomez, 2008); or stage of development
(Trubek and Galanter, 1974; Djankov et al., 2003, Rodrick 2004).
The welfare performance of centralization and decentralization
obviously depend on the shape ofW. In Section 4, we consider the case
of smooth externalities, i.e., coordination costs that are small when
policies are sufficiently similar and that increase gradually as policies
become more heterogeneous. This can be the case of policies which
have a natural distance (e.g., time zones and criminal sentences) or
which comprise a large number of items (e.g., a body of law or a
complex regulation). In Section 5, we extend the analysis to the
opposite case of coordination costs which jump discontinuously as
policies become slightly different. This assumption is more natural for
technological standards, dichotomous decisions, or public services
whose standardization allows for economies of scale.
3.2. Coordination externalities
In this subsection, we discuss examples of laws and policies which
generate coordination externalities. Nonuniform state laws on
consumer protection (packaging and labeling regulations, regulations
on the quality of professional services) generate uncertainty and
informational costs for consumers who buy imported goods and
services, or shop across borders. Variations in product liability
increase litigation costs by encouraging forum shopping; it gives a
sense of unfairness which is detrimental to law enforcement.9 The
latter point applies more generally to most penal laws and is at the
root of the U.S. Sentencing Reform Act, which harmonizes penal
sentences in order to “provide certainty and fairness”while “avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities”.10 Nonuniform consumer pro
tection rules, accounting norms, or governance rules also increase
legal uncertainty and compliance costs for firms which produce or
invest in different jurisdictions (Kox et al., 2005). Likewise, hetero
geneous default rules in contract law make it harder for contracting
parties to infer what might happen in case of disputes or unforeseen
contingencies. This unpredictability can only be mitigated through
costly information acquisition or by making the contract excessively
detailed, which limit the gains from trade.11 These barriers to trade
increase consumer switching costs, reduce competition within each
state, limit the spread of markets and thus decrease consumer
welfare.
Coordination costs are not confined to the legal and regulatory
spheres. Distant time zones make cross border cooperation harder.
Incompatibilities of technical standards hamper the efficiency of
global supply chains. Miscoordinated demand management policies
can be counterproductive (Gordon and Pelkmans, 1979). The
harmonization of cultural policies through, for instance, a common
official language or a uniform elementary and secondary school
system, creates a commonality of experience and a sense of
community.12 A common academic architecture at the university
level increases student mobility and competition in the education
market. The standardization of certain types of public services3
(telecommunication andmilitary equipment) can economize on fixed
costs (Mattli and Büthe, 2003). In some localities, zoning laws
regulate the details of facade design to guarantee the harmony of
the streetscape. As for foreign policies, the inability of a federation to
speak with a single voice limits its bargaining power in international
fora (Coeure and Pisani Ferry, 2003; Smaghi, 2004) or when
negotiating with another country, as is illustrated by Russia's use of
energy security to divide and rule European states (Bressand, 2010).13
Diverging positions on the location of common borders, the naming of
shared seas, the recognition of independence of other countries, or the
historical record of past events can strain diplomatic relations, as
illustrated by the controversy over the naming of the sea of Japan or
the treatment of World War II in Japanese history textbooks (Ienaga,
1993; Beal et al., 2001).3.3. Centralization and decentralization
We assume that under decentralization, local governments
maximize the welfare of their respective constituencies but do not
internalize the impact of their decisions on the rest of the federation.
Formally, a decentralized equilibrium is a (pure strategy) Nash
equilibrium of the noncooperative game in which the set of players
is the set of jurisdictions I, the strategy of each jurisdiction i∈ I is its
local policy xi∈X and its payoff Ui is the welfare of its residents as
given in Eq. (1).14
Under centralization, policies are assumed to be uniform across all
jurisdictions. Since our results give conditions under which decen
tralization is socially preferred to any uniform policy, we do not have
to specify the mechanism used to select the centralized policy.
The uniformity assumption reflects the managerial intuition that
more centralized organizations exhibit more rigidity. It has been the
workhorse of most of the federalism literature. Its lack of theoretical
foundation has recently been criticized by several authors.15 Below,
we explain why unitarian centralization is a relevant scenario in our
setup, more so than in fiscal federalism.
Empirically, numerous nonbudgetary policies and laws have been
completely standardized, either voluntarily (the Merchant Law in
medieval Europe, the Uniform Sales Act in the U.S., or the recent joint
French German history textbook), through directives (the Common
Technical Regulation in the EU.), or by federal legislation (the
common time zone in China, international trade and monetary
policies in the U.S. and in the EU.).
Second, globalization and the increasing interdependence of
economies have made regulatory and legislative harmonization
more popular among federal administrators16 and international
institutions.17 The calls for a European civil code or for the unification
of the external representation of the EU proceed from the same
logic.18 The appeal of a single rule is that it removes all coordination
costs. Hence, contrary to the case of local public goods, policy
harmonization is beneficial per se in our setup.13 The idea that internal divisions can affect the bargaining power of a group of states
goes back to the literature on two level games (Putnam, 1988). See Meunier (2000) for
a different perspective and more recent references.
14 Alternatively, Ui can be viewed as the welfare of the median voter in jurisdiction i.
15 See, e.g., Cremer, Estache and Seabright (1996); Seabright (1996); Qian and
Weingast (1997); Lockwood (2002); Besley and Coate (2003); Oates (2005); Harstad
(2007), or Loeper (2008).
16 The 2008 U.S. Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure
states (p. 126): “The lack of regulatory uniformity in the U.S. in a time of increasing
convergence and globalization has caused many insurers to question the effectiveness
and efficacy of state regulation.” Section 4 of the Canada Business Corporations Act
(1985) reads: “the purposes of this act are … to advance the cause of uniformity of
business corporation law in Canada.”
17 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of the W.T.O. states that “where
technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist …
members shall use them … as a basis for their technical regulations.”
18 See e.g. Strauss-Kahn (2002) or Smaghi (2004).By the same token, while agency costs at the federal level result in
an unequal allocation of federal funds for local projects (Lockwood,
2002; Besley and Coate, 2003; Solé and Sorribas, 2007), they create
harmonization forces in our setup: whether she ignores local
information (Baniak and Grazl, 2009; Loeper, 2008), favors a member
of the federation, or wants to promote federal goals at the expenses of
local needs, a federal policy maker would prefer uniform policies. As
noted by Farber, 1997 (p.1289), “overzealous free trade tribunals may
push too hard for uniformity.”
4. Decentralization theorems
In line with Carbonara and Parisi (2007) or Baniak and Grazl
(2009), in this section we assume that the welfare of jurisdictions, as
specified in Eq. (1), is differentiable and strictly convex in x.
A convex function W corresponds to coordination costs which are
small when policies are sufficiently similar and which grow
increasingly rapidly as local policies differ more significantly. This
assumption has a straightforward interpretation for simple policies
such as setting time zones or speed limits. As argued earlier, for
complex, multifaceted policies such as the selection of default rules in
contract law or school curricula, the Euclidean distance in Eq. (1) can
be interpreted as the number of items on which two policies differ. In
that case, the convexity requirement means that each additional
difference between two policies generates increasingly large coordi
nation costs. Although the convexity of coordination costs allows us to
derive stronger results, we show in Subsection 4.4 that the main
qualitative insights of our model extend to the case of smooth but
nonconvex externalities.
As argued in Subsection 3.1, Vi can be interpreted as the adaptation
cost borne by jurisdiction i to change its policy to make it more
compatible with that of its neighbors. In the case of laws, the
convexity of Vi means that a partial harmonization requires small
adaptation costs but transplanting a foreign law from a country with
widely different institutions and legal culture would either be
ineffective or require deep institutional reforms.19 In the case of
school curricula, it means that incremental changes would require
teachers only to modify the material of a few classes but more
numerous and substantial changes would require to reform the
training programs of teachers, write new textbooks, and adapt college
curricula.20
For technical reasons, throughout this section, we add the
following minor assumption which roughly means that intrinsic
preferences are decreasing in all directions outside a bounded set.
Assumption 1. For all i∈ I and all v∈X, there exists a∈R such that xi.
v≥a implies ∇Vi(xi).vb0.
To sharpen our results, we will occasionally use the following
assumptions:
Definition 1. Intrinsic preferences are Euclidean if for all i∈ I, Vi(xi)=
V(‖xi−θi‖) for some θ∈X|I| and some function V : Rþ→R such that
V′(0)=0 and V″b0. Preferences are furthermore quadratic if for all i,
Ui xð Þ = −‖xi−θi‖2−∑
j≠i
βi;j‖xi−xj‖
2
: ð2Þ19 See Trubek and Galanter (1974); Mattei (1994); Teubner (1998); Black et al.
(2000) or Berkowitz et al. (2003) on the successes and failures of legal transplants as a
function of their responsiveness to local needs and preferences.
20 Notice that the usual justification for the convexity of the production function
applies also to coordination and adaptation costs: to reduce the costs of policy
heterogeneity policy makers are more likely to harmonize first the parts of their policy
that reduce the most coordination costs (W) and generate the least adaption costs (V).
That means that the marginal reduction in coordination costs due to additional
harmonization efforts decreases as policies become more harmonized while the
marginal adaptation cost increases.
4
21 The Article 30 and 36 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the
Dormant Commerce Clause in the U.S., and Article III of the G.A.T.T. forbid
discriminatory laws. See Farber (1997) or Ederington (2001) for more on
discriminatory regulations.Proposition 1. A decentralized equilibrium exists. It is Pareto inefficient
whenever arg max(Vi(xi)) is not the same for all jurisdictions.
In the case of two jurisdictions with Euclidean intrinsic preferences
such that θ1≠θ2, for any Pareto efficient policy x* and any decentralized
equilibrium xdec, ‖x1*−x2*‖b‖x1dec−x2dec‖.
Under decentralization, coordination externalities are not inter
nalized: as in Garoupa and Ogus (2006), each jurisdiction free rides
on the harmonization efforts of its neighbors, which triggers a race to
local particularism. Consequently, the cost of decentralization takes
the form of a lack of policy harmonization. Alternatively, a uniform
policy removes coordination costs but may not reconcile the interests
of heterogeneous jurisdictions. We end up with a classic trade off
between meeting local needs and internalizing externalities.
The following conditions will be the main determinants of the
comparative advantage of centralization and decentralization.
Definition 2. Externalities are reciprocal if, for all i≠ j, ωiβi, j=ωjβj, i.
They are sufficiently elastic if, for all d∈Rþ;W′ dð ÞdW dð Þ ≥2.
They are sufficiently inelastic if, for all d∈Rþ;W′ dð ÞdW dð Þ ≤ε for some
εb2.
With evenly populated jurisdictions, externalities are reciprocal
whenever the matrix β is symmetric, that is when the differences
between the policies of two jurisdictions impose the same cost on
both of them. In the general case, the more populated region should
impose a proportionally greater externality.
The elasticity
W′ dð Þd
W dð Þ measures the relative rate of increase of
coordination costs as policies get farther apart. It is related to the
degree of convexity of coordination costs: if W(d)=dα, then
externalities are sufficiently elastic (inelastic) if and only if α≥2
(b2). Observe that the notions of reciprocality and elasticity are
orthogonal to the magnitude of externalities.
4.1. The reciprocality of externalities
The following proposition shows that reciprocal externalities
make decentralization socially superior independently of the magni
tude of externalities and the heterogeneity of intrinsic preferences.
Proposition 2. If externalities are reciprocal and sufficiently elastic,
decentralization is socially preferred to any uniform policy.
The intuition is that reciprocal externalities impose some
congruence between private and social coordination costs: if ωiβi,
j=ωjβj, i, the coordination cost suffered by jurisdiction i,ωiβi, jW(‖xi−
xj‖), is half of the total coordination costs (ωiβi, j+ωjβj, i)W(‖xi−xj‖)
involving i and j. Hence, jurisdiction i internalizes half of the social
cost. As a result, decentralized decision making achieves a satisfactory
balance between policy coordination and responsiveness to local
circumstances.
More formally, if externalities are reciprocal, non cooperative
decentralization is a potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996):
all jurisdictions maximize the same potential function
P xð Þ = ∑
i
ωiVi xið Þ−
1
2
∑
i
∑
j≠i
ωiβi; jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
: ð3Þ
The potential P differs from the social welfare B only through the
weight of the double sum (the external effects) which is twice as
small as in B.
In Subsection 4.3, we discuss in more detail the elasticity condition
of Proposition 2 and show that it cannot be dispensed with. However,
in Subsection 4.4 we show that the reciprocality of externalitiesmakes the case for decentralization stronger even when the elasticity
condition is not satisfied.
The next proposition shows that some degree of reciprocality is
necessary as well for decentralization to dominate centralization.
Proposition 3. If preferences are quadratic, decentralization is socially
preferred to any uniform policy for all profiles of types θ if and only if
for all i; ∑
j≠i
ωjβj;i−ωiβi; j
 
≤ωi: ð4Þ
Since∑i ∑j≠i ωjβj;i ωiβi;j
 
= 0 for all β and ω, condition (4)
means that the aggregate asymmetry between externalities imposed
and suffered by each jurisdiction∑j≠i ωjβj;i ωiβi;j
 
cannot be too
large in absolute value. For instance, in the case of two evenly
populated jurisdictions, Eq. (4) is equivalent to |β1, 2 β2, 1|≤1, where
1 corresponds to the weight of the intrinsic preferences term in
Eq. (2).
The assumption of symmetric externalities is a reasonable one for
laws which regulate the exchange of goods or services whose bilateral
trade flows are balanced; under this condition, even if legal
fragmentation is not as costly for buyers as for sellers, the aggregate
coordination cost will even out at the jurisdiction level. Conversely, if
there are exchange imbalances, differences in product liability and
accounting rules will be more costly for the exporting firms and for
the investors of the country with a current account surplus. In
addition to balanced trade flows, the reciprocality of externalities
requires that the loss of competition due to transaction costs have a
similar impact on both countries. This condition could be violated, for
instance, if the demand elasticity is not the same in both jurisdictions,
or if domestic competition is more intense in one jurisdiction than in
the other. Coordination costs may also exhibit asymmetries if
regulatory policies discriminate between foreign and domestic
competitors.21
The following simple example illustrates why asymmetries can be
problematic under decentralization.
Example 1. Consider a federation of three jurisdictions with
Euclidean intrinsic preferences such that θ=(−1,0,1) and
β1;2 = β1;3 = β3;1 = β3;2 = 0 and β2;1 = β2;3 = β;
for some βN0. This pattern of externalities can model, for instance,
the following scenario: a large number of workers in state 2 sell their
labor to domestic firms but also to firms in states 1 and 3, while the
residents of states 1 and 3 work only for domestic firms, and states 1
and 3 face an inelastic supply of workers. Under decentralization,
xdec=(−1,0,1): states 1 and 3 have no incentive to harmonize their
labor laws and income taxation procedures to mitigate the
coordination costs borne by the workers of state 2. Clearly, for β
sufficiently large, xdec is socially worse than (0,0,0).
An equally important source of asymmetry comes from the fact
that the coordination costs borne by a jurisdiction may depend on
which side of the policy spectrum it stands. For instance, the cost of
having a different bargaining posture when negotiating with another
country may not be the same for the tough member state as for the
lenient one, although both of themwould prefer the other to conform
to its own posture. To make this point more explicitly, consider the
following illustrative example. The incompatibility of traffic signs
between two jurisdictions will confuse all drivers to a comparable
extent, but different speed limits will probably have a different impact5
on the security and traffic flow in the low speed and high speed
jurisdiction. This means that βi, j has different values, say, βi, j- and βi, j+,
depending on the sign of xi−xj. The reciprocality condition would
then become βi, j−=βj, i+ if xi≤xj, and vice versa. Fiscal competition can
be viewed as one extreme case of such asymmetry for which β−b0
and β+N0,22 which explains why noncooperative behavior is socially
more costly in a race to the bottom scenario than in a coordination
problem.
4.2. The magnitude of externalities
A recurrent question in comparative law and in the trade literature
is whether deeper economic integration and the network of
interdependences it creates justify the harmonization of domestic
policies by federal intervention.23 With our notations, this scenario
corresponds to the case βi, j→∞ for all i, j. The next proposition shows
that the cost of decentralization vanishes as jurisdictions become
highly interdependent. Hence, this model does not confirm the
received wisdom that more severe externalities increase the com
parative advantage of centralization.
Proposition 4. Let βnð Þn≥0 be a sequence of matrices such that, for all
i≠ j, βi, jn →+∞ and βi, jn =O(βj, in ).24 Given Við Þi∈I and W, let xndec be a
decentralized equilibrium for the externality matrix βn, let xn* be a Pareto
improving policy (not necessarily uniform), and let Undec and Un* denote
the corresponding profile of welfare. Then Undec−Un*→0.
The condition that for all i≠ j, βi, jn =O(βj, in ), which means that βi, jn
and βj, in tend to infinity at a similar rate, is reminiscent of the
reciprocality condition of Proposition 2. One can easily adapt Example 1
to show that for I≥3, decentralization can be arbitrarily costlywhen this
symmetry condition is not satisfied.25 Observe that since we do not
require the Pareto improving policy xn* to be uniform, Proposition 4
means that as the degree of interdependence increases in an
asymptotically symmetric fashion, decentralization gets arbitrarily
close to the Pareto frontier. The reason is that when the need for
coordination becomes crucial and reciprocal, the incentives faced by
local policy makers induce enough voluntary harmonization so that
little gains can be expected from a central intervention.
Economists and legal scholars have documented numerous
episodes of spontaneous legal harmonization during periods of
economic and political integration. Prominent examples include the
laws of international sales of goods after the World War II; the
adoption of the Uniform Sales Act or the Model Penal Code in the U.S.;
or the Law Merchant in medieval Europe. In all these cases,
harmonization emerged as an equilibrium of a coordination game
rather than as the result of a coercive top down intervention.26
Likewise, languages are social conventions which require a lot of
coordination. Yet, most languages develop without any central
authority. As Friedman and Friedman (1980) (p. 25) put it, “language
… is a complex structure that is continually changing and developing.
It has a well defined order, yet no central body planned it.”
Decentralization is clearly also optimal when externalities are
negligible. So Proposition 4 implies that contrary to the case of22 The high-tax country wants the low-tax country to choose a tax rate closer to its
own, so β b0, while the low-tax country prefers to have the high tax country raise its
tax rate even further, so β+N0.
23 See, e.g., Lando (2000) and Rodrik (2004) for two different views on the question.
24 For two positive sequences unð Þn and vnð Þn , un=O(vn) if limsup
un
vn
b + ∞.
25 In Example 1, if we assume quadratic preferences and set β2, 1=β2, 3=bn and βi, j=
Bn for all other i≠ j, simple algebra shows that xdec = 3bnð Þ 1;0; 3bnð Þ 1
 
and
Udecn
 
2→ ∞ whenever Bn = bnð Þ
2→∞. In the case I=2, Proposition 8 shows that no
symmetry condition is necessary.
26 See Berman (1965) and Honnold (1999) on international sales law, Ribstein and
Kobayashi (1996) and Smythe (2008) on the diffusion of uniform laws in the U.S., and
Kerr (1929) on the history of the Law Merchant. See also Cooper (1994) for more
examples of spontaneous international policy coordination.expenditure externalities, the cost of decentralization is not mono
tonic in the magnitude of externalities. To understand this discrep
ancy, one has to compare the effect of an increase in the externalities
on the gap between the private and the social benefits of public good
provision in the fiscal federalism case and on the gap between the
private and the social benefits of policy harmonization in the
coordination externality case. An increase in the magnitude of
(positive) spillovers accruing from other jurisdictions increases the
social returns from public good provision but decreases its private
returns the usual free riding problem. In contrast, an increase in
coordination costs increases both the private and the social returns
from policy harmonization.
The proof of Proposition 4 basically shows that, as externalities
increase, decentralized policies converge sufficiently rapidly towards
a uniform policy. However, one cannot simply conclude that in the
limit, decentralization is equivalent to unitarian centralization: the
forces that determine which uniform policy is implemented are not
the same under the two regimes. Under decentralization, policies are
determined by the strategic interactions generated by the patterns of
interjurisdictional interdependencies. It turns out that if the latter are
sufficiently reciprocal, decentralized policies converge to the socially
optimal policy as jurisdictions become increasingly interdependent.
Proposition 5. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4, if furthermore
ωiβi, jn ∼ωjβj, in for all i≠ j,27 then xndec tends toward the socially optimal
policy and∑
i
ωiUdecn;i tends toward the optimal level of social welfare.
On the other hand, centralized policies are usually determined by
voting rules which typically select the optimal policy only for very
special profiles of preferences,28 or through top down bureaucratic
procedures whose outcome can be biased by the interests of federal
administrators or by their lack of information. Therefore, Proposition 5
implies the following
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Proposition 5, if the centralized
uniform policy xc is a function of the jurisdictions' intrinsic preferences
Við Þi∈I which is different from the socially optimal one, then decentral
ization is socially preferred to centralization when externalities are
sufficiently large.4.3. The elasticity of externalities
Proposition 3 implies that when externalities are sufficiently
asymmetric, centralization can improve on decentralization in
aggregate terms. However, if side payments are not possible,
asymmetries may compound the distributional problem of making
all jurisdictions better off. The next proposition shows that when
externalities are sufficiently elastic, a uniform rule will generate
discontentment regardless of either the magnitude of externalities or
the heterogeneity of preferences.
Proposition 6. If externalities are sufficiently elastic, there is no uniform
policy which Pareto dominates a decentralized equilibrium.
Reciprocally, if externalities are sufficiently inelastic and if intrinsic
preferences are Euclidean, then there is a profile of preferences θ and a
decentralized equilibrium xdec(θ)which is Pareto dominated by a uniform
policy.
Thus, Proposition 6 shows that elastic externalities support the
argument for decentralization. Although the elasticity condition can
be difficult to check precisely in practice, recall that
W′ dð Þd
W dð Þ measures27 For two positive sequences unð Þn and vnð Þn , un∼(vn) if lim
un vnj j
un
= 0.
28 For instance, if X = R and preferences are quadratic, the optimal uniform policy is
the mean of the jurisdictions types, but the majority rule equilibrium is the median
type.
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29 Notice that such externalities could be described as completely inelastic in the
sense of Definition 2 since δ(xi,xj) is the limit of ‖xi xj‖
ε as ε→0.
30 Even if all jurisdictions have the same ideal p*=arg maxVi, any uniform policy can
be an equilibrium if network effects are sufficiently important.
31 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is a U.S. group
which promotes legal uniformity across states. Since its founding in 1892, it has
drafted over 200 model laws including the Uniform Sales Act. See Ribstein and
Kobayashi (1996) on the N.C.C.U.S.L or Smythe (2008) on the Uniform Sales Act. The
American Law Institute (ALI) is a group of U.S. legal practitioners that promotes the
clarification, simplification, and uniformization of the American common law. It has
drafted inter alia the Model Penal Code, which has been adopted in parts or in entirety
by many states.
32 The purpose of UNIDROIT, which counts 61 members, is to harmonize and
coordinate private international law. UNCITRAL was established in 1966 “to promote
the progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law.” It now has
60 members. For instance, UNCITRAL developed the UN-convention on Contracts for
the International Sales of Goods which has been adopted by more than 70 states.
33 See Snidal (1985); Farber (1997) or Posner (2006) for such an account of
international law.
34 The class of decentralization game with payoffs given by Eq. (6) is strategically
equivalent to the class no-spillover, positive-externality game defined in Konishi et al.
(1997). However, their main existence result requires additional conditions,
(anonimity, order-invariance, and order-preservation condition) which explains why
a PSNE might not exist in general.the relative rate of increase of coordination costs as a function of
the relative increase in the distance/similarities between two
policies. So the elasticity condition roughly means that when the
number of discrepancies between two regulations is multiplied,
say, by two, the additional compliance cost should be sufficiently
large in relative terms. Qualitatively, Proposition 6 simply states the
higher this rate of increase, the stronger the case for decentraliza
tion. The intuition is that when externalities are sufficiently elastic,
the marginal cost of having more distant policies becomes steep
before the level of the coordination costs becomes too large. This
prevents jurisdictions from implementing policies which are too
incompatible.
Surprisingly, we shall see in Section 5 that the opposite case of
completely inelastic externalities (i.e.,
W′ dð Þd
W dð Þ →0) also supports the
argument for decentralization. This case is not treated in Proposition 6
because completely inelastic externalities make preferences non
convex.
4.4. Robustness
In this subsection, we show that the two main insights of the
model that symmetric externalities increase the relative advantage
of decentralization and that the cost of decentralization vanishes as
the need for coordination increases still hold qualitatively without
imposing any convexity or elasticity conditions on coordination costs.
In this subsection, we assume that preferences are (3 times)
differentiable, W is strictly increasing, and intrinsic preferences are
Euclidean. We restrict attention to the case of two jurisdictions and
decompose the externality matrix into its symmetric part, βS =
β1;2 + β2;1
2
, and its antisymmetric part, βA =
β1;2−β2;1
2
.
Proposition 7. For all V, W, (θ1,θ2), and βS, there exists εN0 such that
for all decentralized equilibria x at some βA such that βA∈]0,ε[, there
exists an equilibrium x0 at βA=0 such that B(x)bB(x0).
Observe that given βS, the social welfare function B does not depend
directly on βA, so Proposition 7 shows that the asymmetry of
externalities increase the cost of decentralization. Moreover, since
social welfare under centralization does not depend on β, Proposition 7
implies that if decentralization is dominated by a uniform policy at
βA=0, then it is also dominated by the same uniform policy for all
βA∈ [−ε,ε] for some εN0.
The next proposition generalizes Proposition 4.
Proposition 8. Let βn→∞, let xndec be a decentralized equilibrium and xn*
be a Pareto improving policy vector (not necessarily uniform), and let
Un
dec and Un* be the corresponding profiles of welfare, then Undec−Un*→0.
5. Discontinuities and network externalities
For many types of policies such as technical standards (e.g.,
voltage, rail gage, and thickness of credit cards), dichotomous choices
(e.g., ratification of an international convention and official recogni
tion of a country), or public goods and services whose standardization
can economize on fixed costs (e.g., drafting costs for laws, telecom
munication infrastructure, and military equipment), what matters is
not the degree of similarity between policies but which jurisdictions
have the exact same policy.
The utility function specified in Eq. (1) can encompass this type
of discontinuous network effects if it takes the following specific
form:
Ui xð Þ = Vi xið Þ−∑
j≠i
βi; jδ xi; xj
 
; ð5Þwhere the function δ : X × X→R is defined by δ(xi,xj)=0 if xi=xj, and
δ(xi,xj)=1 otherwise.29 However, our main result can be extended to
a larger class of utility functions:
Ui xð Þ = ϒi xi; j∈I : xj = xi
n o 
: ð6Þ
For this specification, X is an arbitrary set; the function ϒi :
X × 2I→R takes as its first argument the policy of jurisdiction i, and as
its second argument the set of jurisdictions which have the same
policy as jurisdiction i, ϒi is increasing in its second argument in the
inclusion sense.
In contrast to the case of smooth externalities, the decentralization
game defined in Subsection 3.3 with the payoffs given by Eq. (6) can
have a continuum of equilibria, some of them quite unsatisfactory.30
For this reason, the decentralization theorems in Section 4 must be
qualified: there is no nontrivial condition on β which guarantees that
any decentralized equilibrium dominates centralization. However, the
next proposition shows that if jurisdictions can easily coordinate on
Pareto improving equilibria, the rationality of local jurisdictions is
sufficient to achieve policy harmonization whenever it is socially
beneficial.
Proposition 9. Suppose that for all i, Ui is given by Eq. (6). If a uniform
policy Pareto dominates a decentralized equilibrium, then this uniform
policy is also a decentralized equilibrium.
Once again, in contrast with the free riding scenario, the absence
of cooperation under decentralization does not justify a federal
intervention in the form of coercive standardization. Proposition 9
stresses the importance of mechanisms, conventions, or institutions
that help jurisdictions coordinate on a Pareto improving uniform
equilibrium. Examples of such institutions include federal regulatory
bodies such as NCCUSL or ALI31; international conventions such as
UNIDROIT or UNCITRAL32; or international organizations such as the
WTO or the IMF. These institutions promote legal and regulatory
uniformity by proposing model laws whose adoption is then left to
the discretion of its members. Likewise, international treaties and
agreements result in some degree of harmonization but bind states
only with their own consent.33
A technical remark is in order: as the game theoretic literature has
highlighted (Konishi et al., 1997), the decentralization game defined
in Section 3.3 may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(henceforth PSNE) when payoffs exhibit discontinuous network
effects as in Eq. (6).34 For instance, in the case of three jurisdictions7
(and |X|≥3)35 with payoffs given by Eq. (5), if one of the two
following conditions is satisfied:
β1;2 N β1;3;β2;3 N β2;1 and β3;1 N β3;2;
or β1;2bβ1;3;β2;3bβ2;1 and β3;1bβ3;2:

then there exists a profile of intrinsic preferences Við Þi∈I such that no
PSNE exists. Reciprocally, if neither condition is satisfied and
argmaxVi≠∅ for all i, a PSNE always exists.36 In words, the
nonexistence of a PSNE requires a cycle in which each jurisdiction
prefers to conform to its follower than to its predecessor. This suggests
that the non existence of a PSNE arises under rather special
circumstances.37
Characterizing the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a PSNE in the general case is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, we show in the following proposition that in the
important cases of anonymous or (ordinally) symmetric network
effects, a PSNE always exists.
Proposition 10. Let λ∈R Ij jþ be a vector positive weight and for all i∈ I,
let Vi : X→R be function such that arg maxVi≠∅. If the jurisdictions'
welfare is either given by
Ui xð Þ = Vi xið Þ + λiW xi; j∈I : xj = xi
n o  ;
where W : X × N→R is increasingly in its second argument, or
Ui xð Þ = Vi xið Þ−λi∑j≠iβi;j xið Þδ xi; xj
 
;
Where for all i≠ j and all p∈X, βi, j (p)=βj, i (p)≥0, then a PSNE
exists.
The first specification corresponds to network externalities which
depend on the number but not on the identity of the jurisdictionswhich
choose the same policy. Observe that it does not impose restrictions on
the shape of intrinsic preferences (V) or economies of scale (W) and the
latter can be policy specific. The existence of a PSNE in this case is a
corollary of Konishi et al. (1997). The second specification is the ordinal
extension of the reciprocality condition in Definition 2.
Moreover, in the cases of dichotomous choice, two jurisdictions, or
“consecutive” preferences,38 both existence and efficiency are
guaranteed.
Proposition 11. If either (i)|X|=2, or (ii)I=2, or (iii) the jurisdictions'
welfare is given by
Ui xð Þ = Vi xið Þ + W xi; j∈I : xj = xi
n o 
;
where W : X × 2I→R is increasing in the inclusion sense in its second
argument, Vi is continuous, X is compact and for all p,q∈X, Vi(p)−Vi(q)
is monotonic in i, then there exists a strong (and hence efficient) Nash
equilibrium.
Case (i) is a corollary of Konishi et al. (1997) and case (iii) is a
corollary of Greenberg and Weber (1986).35 If I=2 or |X|=2, a PSNE always exists, see proposition 10.
36 The proof of this result is available from the author upon request.
37 Moreover, the conditions on the profile of intrinsic preferences V necessary to
obtain the nonexistence of a PSNE are such that each jurisdiction has a different most
preferred policy and each policy is unacceptable for one jurisdiction.
38 The consecutiveness of preferences (condition (iii) of proposition 11) has the
flavor of a single crossing condition: it essentially requires that jurisdictions can be
ordered such that if i≤ j≤k and the best responses of i and k coincide at some strategy
profile, then so must j's best response.6. Concluding remarks
Our model shows that when the fiscal prisoner's dilemma turns
into an administrative or legislative battle of the sexes, the compar
ative statics of the comparison between centralization and decentral
ization are qualitatively different and the welfare analysis shifts in
favor of decentralization: the cost of decentralization vanishes as the
need for coordination increases, andwhen externalities are reciprocal,
decentralization dominates centralization irrespective of the magni
tude of externalities and the heterogeneity of preferences.
The consequences of legal and regulatory heterogeneity lend
themselves more easily to money metric measurements than do the
adaptation costs associated with the unsuitability of laws to local
needs. This asymmetry may have led federal administrators to
overemphasize the need for harmonization. However, one cannot
leap from the premise that globalization has increased the need for
policy harmonization to the conclusion that coercive standardization
is the best way to effect it. Our model suggests instead that
decentralization can strike a satisfactory balance between respon
siveness to local preferences and policy coordination regardless of the
severity of costs generated by legal heterogeneity.
To conclude, we mention a couple of limitations of this model
which point toward directions for further research. First, our model
does not include the potential benefits of competitive regulatory
federalism, which would tilt the balance further in favor of
decentralization.39 Second, we do not explicitly model the legislative
process40 and the influence of lobbies.41 In Loeper (2010), we show
that decentralization entails less policy harmonization when local
policies are under the control of locally elected representatives.
Finally, we do not allow for intermediate regimes between complete
centralization and decentralization. In Loeper (2009), we allow for
partial decentralization by letting citizens vote on the degree of local
discretion left to local jurisdictions.
Appendix A
In what follows, for any differentiable function f : X→R;∇f pð Þ
denotes the gradient of f at p∈X. For all x∈XI, x− i denotes the policies
of all jurisdictions j≠ i and (p,x− i) denotes the vector of policies in
which xi has been replaced by p. The following two Lemmas prove
Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. If preferences are differentiable, strictly convex and satisfy
Assumption 1, a decentralized equilibrium exists. It is uniform if and only
if arg maxVi is the same for all jurisdictions. It is inefficient otherwise.
All equilibria belong to some bounded set which depends only on Við Þi∈I .
For any v∈X and any equilibrium x, ∇Vi(xi).v is non positive for
some i and non negative for others.
Proof. Since utility functions are differentiable and convex, the
decentralized equilibria are the solutions of the FOC:
for i = 1::I;∇Vi xið Þ = ∑
j
βi;j
W′ ‖xi−xj‖
 
‖xi−xj‖
xi−xj
 
; ð7Þ
with the convention that
W′ ‖xi−xj‖
 
‖xi−xj‖
xi−xj
 
= 0 whenever xi=xj
(since W′(0)=0 by differentiability of Ui).39 See, e.g., Mattei (1994) or Ogus (1999) on competitive federalism in the legal sphere.
40 Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) model explicitly legislative
behavior at the federal level in a local public good model.
41 A natural conjecture is that legal practitioners and domestic firms will lobby
against legal harmonization if it threatens their local monopoly while international
firms will lobby in favor of harmonization. See Ribstein and Kobayashi (1996) or
Smythe (2008) for an empirical estimate of the influence of legal practitioners on state
adoption of uniform laws. See also Redoano (2007) for a model of lobbying in a fiscal
federalism setup.
8
If all jurisdictions have the same ideal policy p=arg maxVi, (p,..,p)
is trivially an efficient equilibrium. The proof that it is the only
equilibrium is omitted for the sake of brevity. Moreover, one can see
from Eq. (7) that a uniform equilibrium cannot occur otherwise.
Assume now that jurisdictions do not all have the same ideal
policy. Rearranging Eq. (7), we get
xi =
∑j
βi;jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
 
‖xi−xj‖
xj
∑j
βi;jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
 
‖xi−xj‖
+
∇Vi xið Þ
∑j
βi;jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
 
‖xi−xj‖
: ð8Þ
For any v∈X, let n be such that xi.v≤xn.v for all i∈ I. Taking the
scalar product of Eq. (8) with v, we see that necessarily∇Vn(xn).v≥0.
From Assumption 1, this implies that xn.vba for some a which
depends only on v and Vn. So for all i∈ I, xi.v≤a. Since v is arbitrary,
this proves that the decentralized equilibria are necessarily in a
bounded rectangle which depends only on Við Þi∈I . The convexity of Ui
completes the proof of the existence of a decentralized equilibrium.
Now let m be such that xi.v≥xm.v for all i∈ I, and consider the
policy vector x′ such that xm′=xm+εv, xn′=xn−εv and xi′=xi for
i≠n,m. We show that x′ Pareto dominates x for ε sufficiently small:
for all jurisdictions other than n and m, their coordination costs
decrease while their intrinsic utility stays constant. For jurisdictions n,
changing xn has no first order effect since x is an equilibrium while
changing xm has a positive first order effect on coordination costs. A
symmetric reasoning applies to m. □
Lemma 2. If intrinsic preferences are Euclidean, θ⇉xdec(β,θ) is onto on
a neighborhood of (0,..,0).
In the case of two jurisdictions with θ1≠θ2, for any Pareto optimal
policy x* and any decentralized equilibrium xdec, ‖x1*−x2*‖b‖x1dec−x2dec‖.
Proof. From the intermediate value theorem, V′ is onto on [0,
limd→+∞V′(d)[. So for ‖v‖ sufficiently small and for any xi∈X,
θi = V ′ð Þ 1 ‖v‖ð Þ
v
‖v‖
−xi solves the equation ∇Vi(xi)=v for Vi(xi)=
V(‖xi−θi‖). As shown earlier,W′(d)→0 as d→0, so the right hand side
of Eq. (7) tends to 0 as xi−xj→0 for all i, j. This proves that there exists
(θ1,..,θI) such that Eq. (7) is satisfied for any x close enough to (0,..,0).
If furthermore I=2,Eq. (7) implies thatx1 and x2 belong to [θ1,θ2] and
V ′ ‖x1−θ1‖ð Þ
β1;2
=
V ′ ‖x2−θ2‖ð Þ
β2;1
= −W′ ‖x1−x2‖ð Þ: ð9Þ
Since utility functions are concave, a Pareto optimal policy
maximizes ω1U1(y)+ω2U2(y) for some ω1N0 and ω2N0 (the case
ω1=0 or ω2=0 is obvious). The first order conditions imply that x1*
and x2* belong to [θ1,θ2] and
V ′ ‖x1−θ1‖ð Þ
β1;2 + ω2 =ω1ð Þβ2;1
=
V ′ ‖x2−θ2‖ð Þ
β2;1 + ω1 =ω2ð Þβ1;2
= −W′ ‖x1−x

2‖
 
: ð10Þ
Suppose ‖x1*−x2*‖≥‖x1−x2‖. Since V′ is decreasing and W′ is
increasing, by comparing Eqs. (9) and (10), we see that ‖xi−θi‖b‖xi*−
θi‖ for i=1,2, which is impossible if x1,x2,x1* and x2* belong to [θ1,θ2]. □
Lemma 3. Let x be a decentralized equilibrium, (p,…,p) a uniform
policy, Udec and Uc the corresponding profile of utility, then if externalities
are sufficiently elastic,
Udeci −Uci≥ Vi xið Þ−Vi pð Þ−∇Vi xið Þ: xi−pð Þ½  + ∑
j≠i
Ti; j;
where Ti; j=βi; jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
  ‖xi−p‖2−‖xj−p‖2
2‖xi−xj‖
and Ti; j=0 if xi=xj:If externalities are sufficiently inelastic
Udeci −Uci≤Vi xið Þ−Vi pð Þ−∇Vi xið Þ: xi−pð Þ
+ ∑
j≠i
Ti; j +
ε−2
2
∑
j≠i
βi; jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
for some εb2. If preferences are quadratic,
Udeci −U
c
i = ‖xi−p‖
2 + ∑
j
βi;j ‖xi−p‖
2−‖xj−p‖
2
h i
:
Proof. Simple algebra yields
xi−xj
 
: xi−pð Þ−
1
2
‖xi−xj‖
2 =
1
2
‖xi−p‖
2−‖xj−p‖
2
h i
; ð11Þ
Using successively the elasticity condition, Eqs. (7) and (11) we
get
∇Vi xið Þ: xi−pð Þ−∑
j
βi;jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
≥∇Vi xið Þ: xi−pð Þ−
1
2
∑
j
βi;jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
 
‖xi−xj‖
≥∑j βi;jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
  xi−xj : xi−pð Þ
‖xi−xj‖
−1
2
‖xi−xj‖
2
4
3
5
≥∑j βi;jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
  ‖xi−p‖2−‖xj−p‖2
2‖xi−xj‖
" #
:
ð12Þ
To get the desired inequality in the elastic case, substitute Eq. (12)
into
Udeci −U
c
i = Vi xið Þ−Vi pð Þ−∇Vi xið Þ: xi−pð Þ½  ð13Þ
+ ∇Vi xið Þ: xi−pð Þ−∑
j
βi;jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
: ð14Þ
If preferences are quadratic,
W′ dð Þd
W dð Þ ≡2 so Eq. (12) holds with
equality. Simple algebra yields that the summand in Eq. (12) is
βi;j ‖xi−p‖2−‖xj−p‖2
 
and the right hand side of Eq. (13) is ‖xi−p‖2,
which proves the quadratic case.
If externalities are sufficiently inelastic, using Definition 2, for
some εb2,
∑j βi;jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
=
ε
2
∑
j
βi;jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
+
ε−2
2
∑
j
βi;jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
≥−1
2
∑
j
βi;jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
 
‖xi−xj‖ +
ε−2
2
∑
j
βi;jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
:
The above inequality, together with Eqs. (7) and (11), implies that
∇Vi xið Þ: xi−pð Þ−∑
j
βi;jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
− ε−2
2
∑
j
βi;jW ‖xi−xj‖
 
≤∑
j
βi;jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
  xi−xj : xi−pð Þ
‖xi−xj‖
−1
2
‖xi−xj‖
2
4
3
5
≤∑
j
1
2
βi;jW′ ‖xi−xj‖
  ‖xi−p‖2−‖xj−p‖2
‖xi−xj‖
" #
:
and we substitute the following inequality in Eq. (14). □
Proof of Proposition 2. With the notations of Lemma 3, if β is
reciprocal, for all i≠ j, ωiTi, j+ωjTj, i=0. So if Bdec and Bc denote the9
42 One can easily check that the socially optimal policy vector y is a decentralized
equilibrium for a confederation with an externality matrix γgiven by γi, j=ωiβi, j+
ωjβj, i. From Lemma 4, (ωiβi, jn +ωjβj, in )W(‖yin yjn‖)→0.social welfare under decentralization and under the uniform policy
(p,..,p),
Bdec−Bc≥∑
i
ωi Vi xið Þ−Vi pð Þ−∇Vi xdeci
 
: xdeci −p
 h i
;
which is nonnegative by concavity of Vi. □
Proof of Proposition 3. If preferences are quadratic, Lemma 3 gives
Bdec−Bc = ∑
i
ωi + ∑
j≠i
ωiβi;j−ωjβj;i
  !
‖xdeci −p‖
2
; ð15Þ
which proves the sufficiency part. If ωi +∑j ωiβi;j−ωjβj;i
 
b0 for
some i, from Lemma 2, there exists θ such that xidec=ε for some εN0
and xjdec=0 for all j≠ i. From Eq. (15), the policy (0,..,0) is socially
preferred to xdec. □
In the following Lemma and in the Proof of Propositions 4 and 5, xn
is a decentralized equilibrium for the profile of preferences
Við Þi∈I ;W;βn
 
.
Lemma 4. Under the condition of Proposition 4, for all i≠ j, βi, jn W′(‖xin−
xj
n‖) is bounded, and βi, jn W(‖xin−xjn‖) and ‖xin−xjn‖ tend to 0.
Proof. We will first show that βni;jW′ ‖x
n
i−xnj ‖
  xni;k−xnj;k :v
‖xni−xnj ‖
is
bounded for all i≠ j and all v∈X. By letting v be each of the vector of
an orthonormal base of X, the first part of the Lemma follows. To clarify
the argument, throughout the proof, we reorder the jurisdictions'
indexes for each n and v so that i≤ j⇒xin.v≥xjn.v. With a slight abuse of
notation, we define the sequence of federations Vni
 
i∈I ;W ;β
n
 
n≥0
and the corresponding decentralized equilibria xnð Þn≥0 consistently
with this reindexation. The latter amounts to a symmetric permutation
of rows and columns of β and a permutation of Við Þi∈I for each v and n.
Hence, we still have βi, jn →+∞ and βi, jn =O(βj, in ) for all i≠ j so the
reindexation is w.l.o.g.
We proceed by induction on i. By construction x1n.v≤xjn.v, so from
Eq. (7),
∇Vn1 x
n
i
 
:v = ∑
j
βn1;j
W′ ‖xn1−xnj ‖
 
‖xn1−xnj ‖
xn1−x
n
j
 
:v: ð16Þ
From Lemma 1, xn is bounded. Therefore, the left hand side of
Eq. (16) is bounded and so is the right hand side. Since the latter is a
sum of non negative scalars, each of them is bounded, which
completes the case i=1.
Assume that the Lemma is true for 1,.., i−1. For any n, by
construction xin.v≥xjn.v for iN j and xin.v≤xjn.v for ib j. From Eq. (7),
∇Vi x
n
i
 
:v−∑
jbi
βni;jW′ ‖x
n
i−x
n
j ‖
  xni−xnj :v
‖xni−xnj ‖
ð17Þ
= α∑
j N i
βni;jW′ ‖x
n
i−x
n
j ‖
  xni−xnj :v
‖xni−xnj ‖
: ð18Þ
By hypothesis, for all jb i, βnj;iW′ ‖x
n
j−xni ‖
  xnj−xni :v
‖xnj−xni ‖
is bounded.
As βi, jn =O(βj, in ), the symmetric term is bounded as well. Therefore,
Eq. (17) and thus Eq. (18) are bounded. Since Eq. (18) is a sum of non
negative terms, each of them is bounded which completes the
induction.Since βi, jn W′(‖xin−xjn‖) is bounded,W′(‖xin−xjn‖) and ‖xin−xjn‖ tend
to 0. Since W is convex,
βni;jW ‖x
n
i−x
n
j ‖
 
≤βni;jW′ ‖x
n
i−x
n
j ‖
 
‖xni−x
n
j ‖;
so from what precedes, βi, jn W(‖xin−xjn‖) tends to 0. □
Proof of Proposition 4. Lemma 4 implies that Udecn − Vi pnð Þð Þi∈I→
0; ::; 0ð Þ for some sequence of policy pnð Þn≥0∈XN. Let ynð Þn≥0 be a
sequence of policy vectors which Pareto improve on xnð Þn≥0 and
denote Un
 
n≥0 the corresponding sequence of utility profiles. Clearly,
for all i≠ j, we must have yin−yjn→0. Since we want to bound above
Un
 
n≥0, we can restrict attention to sequences such that βi, j
n W(‖yin−
yj
n‖)→0. Therefore, there exists qn∈XN such that Un− Vi qnð Þð Þi∈I→
0; ::; 0ð Þ. From Lemma 1, xn is bounded and from Assumption 1, we
can restrict attention to bounded sequences ynð Þn≥0, so pn and qn are
bounded too.
Let p and q be the limits of two converging subsequences of pn
and qn and suppose p≠q. The function fi(a)=Vi(ap+(1−a)q) is
strictly concave on [0,1]. Since fi(0)≤ fi(1), necessarily fi′(0)=∇Vi(p).
(q−p)N0. From Lemma 1, for all n, ∇Vi(xin).(q−p)≤0 for some i.
Taking the limit, ∇Vi(p). (q−p)≤0, a contradiction. So p=q and
Udec=U*. □
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose ωiβi, jn ∼ωjβj, in for all i≠ j. Summing
Eq. (7) over i, we get
∑
i
ωi∇Vi x
n
i
 
= ∑
i;jf g
ωiβ
n
i;j−ωjβ
n
j;i
 
W′ ‖xni−x
n
j ‖
  xni−xnj 
‖xni−xnj ‖
: ð19Þ
From Lemma 4, ωiβi, jn W′(‖xin−xjn‖) is bounded for all i≠ j and
under our assumptions, it is equivalent to the symmetric term. As the
difference of two equivalent and bounded sequences, the right hand
side of Eq. (19) tends to zero. Therefore each local policy xin tends to
the same policy p* defined by∑iωi∇Vi pð Þ = 0. Fromwhat precedes,
for all i, Un, idec→Vi(p*).
One can readily check that (p*,..,p*) is the socially optimal uniform
policy. Moreover, if yn denotes the socially optimal (not necessarily
uniform) policy vector for the federation Við Þi∈I ;W ;βn
 
, necessarily
βi, jn W(‖yin−yjn‖)→0 for all i≠ j.42 Hence, yn tends towards a uniform
policy which must be (p*,..,p*) and Un, i(yn)→Vi(p*). □
The next Lemma is instrumental to the Proof of Proposition 6.
Lemma 5. If W is sufficiently inelastic, then
W dð Þ
d2
is unbounded
around 0.
Proof. Suppose that for some cN0 and some ΔN0, W(d)≤cd2 for all
d∈ [0,Δ]. Since W is sufficiently inelastic, W′≤ cd for some εb2.
Integrating this inequality, we get W≤ 
2
cd2. By induction,
W≤ 
2
 n
cd2 for all n so W≡0, which is impossible by strict convexity
of Ui. □
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that externalities are sufficiently
elastic. Let x be a decentralized equilibrium. If x is uniform, the result
follows from Lemma 1. If not, let p∈X be a policy and i be the
jurisdiction whose local policy under decentralization is the farthest
from p. Under the notation of Lemma 3, Ti, j≤0 for all j. By strict
concavity of Vi, Vi(xi)−Vi(p)−∇Vi(xi).(xi−p) is negative, and thus i
strictly prefers x to (p,..,p).10
43 Differentiating Eq. (20) w.r.t. βS and adding the two equations, we get
∂x2
∂βS
∂x1
∂βS
 
V ″ x1 θ1ð Þ + 2βSW″ x2 x1ð Þ
 
+ W′ x2 x1ð Þ = 0:Since x2≠x1, W′(x2
x1)≠0 so V′ ′(x1 θ1)≠2βSW′ ′(x2 x1).Suppose now that externalities are sufficiently inelastic and that
intrinsic preferences are Euclidean. From Lemma 2, for any local
policy y∈X sufficiently small, there exists a vector of type θ such that
the policy vector defined by xi=y for some i and xi=−y for the
other i is a decentralized equilibrium. We will show that the uniform
policy vector (0,.., 0) is Pareto better than x for this federation. Under
the notation of Lemma 3, Ti, j=0 for all i, j. Since V is twice
differentiable,
V y−θið Þ−V θið Þ−∇Vi y−θið Þ:y = O ‖y‖2
 
:
From Lemma 5,
ε
2
−1
 W 2‖y‖ð Þ
‖y‖2
is negative and unbounded as
y→0. Therefore, summing up all the terms in Lemma 3, we haveUidec−
Ui
cb0 for all i and for y sufficiently close to 0. □
Proof of Proposition 7. Since V and W are differentiable, a decen
tralized equilibrium x satisfies Eq. (7), which implies that x1 and x2
belong to the segment [θ1,θ2]. Therefore, to simplify notations, we
rewrite Eq. (7) in one dimension with the convention that θ1bθ2 (and
thus θ1bx1bx2bθ2):
V ′ x1−θ1ð Þ + β1W′ x2−x1ð Þ = V′ θ2−x2ð Þ + β2W′ x2−x1ð Þ = 0: ð20Þ
From the implicit function theorem, there exists εN0 and a smooth
function (x1,x2)(βA) such that for all βA∈ [−ε,ε], (x1,x2)(βA) satisfies
Eq. (20). Totally differentiating Eq. (20), we get
∂x1
∂βA
V′′ x1−θ1ð Þ +
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	
β1W′′ x2−x1ð Þ +
1
2
W′ x2−x1ð Þ = 0;
− ∂x2∂βA
V ′′ θ2−x2ð Þ +
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	
β2W′′ x2−x1ð Þ−
1
2
W′ x2−x1ð Þ = 0:
Differentiating the two equations above, we obtain
0 =
∂2x1
∂β2A
V ′′ x1−θ1ð Þ +
∂x1
∂βA
 	2
V ′′′ x1−θ1ð Þ
+
∂2x2
∂β2A
−∂
2x1
∂β2A
 !
β1W′′ x2−x1ð Þ +
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	2
β1W′′′ x2−x1ð Þ
+
1
2
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	
W′′ x2−x1ð Þ +
1
2
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	
β1W′′ x2−x1ð Þ
ð21Þ
and
0 = −∂
2x2
∂β2A
V ′′ θ2−x2ð Þ−
∂x2
∂βA
 	2
V ′′′ θ2−x2ð Þ
+
∂2x2
∂β2A
−∂
2x1
∂β2A
 !
β2W′′ x2−x1ð Þ +
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	2
β2W′′′ x2−x1ð Þ
−1
2
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	
W′′ x2−x1ð Þ−
1
2
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	
W′′ x2−x1ð Þ:
ð22Þ
From Eq. (20), x1−x2 must be an even function of βA so at βA=0,
∂x2
∂βA
=
∂x1
∂βA
. Moreover, Eq. (20) implies that at βA=0, x1−θ1=θ2−
x2. Substituting in Eqs. (21) and (22), we get that at βA=0,
∂2x2
∂β2A
−∂
2x1
∂β2A
 !
−V ′′ x1−θ1ð Þ + 2βSW′′ x2−x1ð Þ
 
= 0;which implies that at βA=0,
∂2x2
∂β2A
=
∂2x1
∂β2A
.43 Totally differentiating
B[(x1,x2)(βA)],
∂B∂βA
= V ′ x1−θ1ð Þ
∂x1
∂βA
−V ′ θ2−x2ð Þ
∂x2
∂βA
+ 2βSW′ x2−x1ð Þ
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	
ð23Þ
Substituting
∂x2
∂βA
=
∂x1
∂βA
and x1−θ1=θ2−x2 in Eq. (23), we get
∂B
∂βA
βA = 0ð Þ = 0. Differentiating again Eq. (23), we obtain
∂2B
∂β2A
= V ″ x1−θ1ð Þ
∂x1
∂βA
 	2
+ V ′ x1−θ1ð Þ
∂2x1
∂β2A
+ V ″ θ2−x2ð Þ
∂x2
∂βA
 	2
−V ′ θ2−x2ð Þ
∂2x2
∂β2A
+ 2βSW
″ x2−x1ð Þ
∂x2
∂βA
− ∂x1∂βA
 	2
+ 2βSW′ x2−x1ð Þ
∂2x2
∂β2A
−∂
2x1
∂β2A
 !
:
Substituting
∂x2
∂βA
=
∂x1
∂βA
,
∂2x1
∂β2A
=
∂2x2
∂β2A
and x1− θ1= θ2− x2
above, we get
∂2B
∂β2A
= V ″ x1−θ1ð Þ
∂x1
∂βA
 	2
+
∂x2
∂βA
 	2 !
;
so at βA=0,
∂2B
∂β2A
b0 and
∂B
∂βA
= 0, which completes the proof. □
Proof of Proposition 8. As argued in the proof of Proposition 7, x1n
and x2n belong to [θ1,θ2] and thus are bounded. This implies that U1(xn)
is bounded below by V1(x2n), soW(‖x1n−x2n‖)→0which in turn implies
that x2n−x1n→0. The maximization of U1 w.r.t. x1 implies then that
β1, 2n W(‖x1n−x2n‖)→0. A symmetric reasoning shows that β2, 1n W(‖x2n−
x1
n‖)→0. Therefore, there exists a bounded sequence of policy pnð Þn≥1
such that
Udecn − V ‖p
n−θn1‖
 
;V ‖pn−θn2‖
  
→ 0;0ð Þ:
Following the notations and the reasoning in the Proof of
Proposition 4, there exists a bounded sequence of policy qnð Þn≥1
such that
Un− V ‖q
n−θn1‖
 
;V ‖qn−θn2‖
  
→ 0;0ð Þ:
If p and q are the limits of two converging subsequences of pn and
qn, since p belong to [θ1,θ2] and since V is decreasing, (p,p) is Pareto
optimal among uniform policy vectors so p=q. Since this is true for
any converging subsequence, Undec−Un*→0. □
Proof of Proposition 9. Let x be a decentralized equilibrium and u=
(p,..,p) be a Pareto improving uniform policy. For any q≠p, Ui(x)≥Ui
((q,x− i)). Moreover, { j≠ i :zj=q} is weakly greater in the inclusion
sense for z=x than for z=u. So under our specification in Eq. (6), Ui
((q,x− i))≥Ui((q,u− i)). By assumption, Ui(u)≥Ui(x). Summing up, we
have Ui(u)≥Ui((q,u− i)), so u is a decentralized equilibrium. □
Proof of Proposition 10. In the case of anonymous network effects,
Konishi et al. (1997) (Proposition 4.1 and Section 5) prove that the11
game admits a potential (see Monderer and Shapley, 1996). Likewise,
in the case of symmetric network effects, if we denote
P xð Þ =∑i
Vi xið Þ
λi
+
1
2
∑jβi; j xð Þδ xi−xj
  	
;
then P xi′; x i
 
−P xð Þ = Ui xi′; x i
 
−Ui xð Þ
λi
, which shows that P is a
potential. For all i∈ I, let xi*∈arg maxVi and let X*={xi* : i∈ I}. Since
X* is finite, in both cases, P admits a maximum xe on X
 I , and one
can easily check that xe is a PSNE. □
Proof of Proposition 11. The case |X|=2 is proved in Konishi et al.
(1997) (Proposition 2.2). In the case I=2, observe that if x=
(arg maxV1,arg maxV2) is Pareto efficient, it is also a strong Nash
equilibrium. If not, Pareto efficient policy vectors are necessarily
uniform and any uniform policy vector which Pareto dominates x is a
strong Nash equilibrium. In the case of (iii), one can readily check that
the conditions (i) and (ii) of Greenberg andWeber (1986) (Section V)
are satisfied, so a strong Nash equilibrium exists. □
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